Ugly nexus in Pakistan

BY: BRIG ANIL GUPTA PUBLISHED ON JANUARY 1, 2018

The release of Hafiz Saeed, a dreaded terrorist and head of Jamat ud Dawa (JuD)/ Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and launching of a political party by him Milli Muslim League (MML), has aroused a suspicion in India that our neighbour is trying to rehabilitate the “good” terrorists. A similar concern was raised earlier also by India in 2014 when the state facilitated his famous rally at Minar- i – Pakistan at Lahore where he threatened with Ghazwa-e- Hind. Hafiz Saeed has been one of the strategic assets of Pakistan which has embraced terrorism as an instrument of its state policy. The mastermind of Mumbai terror attack he is responsible for spreading the tentacles of Pakistan’s terror factory not just in Kashmir but across India. His organisation is supported and funded by Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army’s support to Hafiz Saeed and other “good” terrorist organisations is no secret but what is worrying is the way it is trying to mainstream these terrorist organisations into Pakistani politics.

It is rather surprising to see Pakistan Army’s desperation to provide political legitimacy to them and their large scale funding to fight the elections as was evident during the recent two by-elections held to the National Assembly from Lahore and Peshawar. What has surprised the analysts is the number of votes garnered by the candidates of these right-wing Islamic Parties (who contested as independents since their parties had not been recognised by the Pakistan Election Commission) surpassing the candidates of many mainstream political parties.

Undoubtedly, Pakistan was born out of two-nation theory as an Islamic nation. Its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, toyed between the idea of a modern Islamic state viz a viz a conservative Islamic state but was unable to give a clear cut direction to the Constituent Assembly. Pakistan remained a Dominion till as late as 1956 and was renamed as Islamic Republic of Pakistan on 23rd March 1956, declaring Islam as the official religion but did not take any further measures to adopt Islamic laws. Gen Ayub Khan (1958-69) and Gen Yaha Khan (1969-71) continued a secularist tradition and repressed much of Islamic political activism.

Islamisation, in true sense, began in 1971 after bifurcation of Pakistan since the political class sought help of the mullahs to strengthen its hold. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who assumed control of Pakistan after the bifurcation could not withstand the pressure from Islamic parties. Under their pressure he declared Ahmadiya community as non- Muslim and banned alcohol, gambling and night clubs in the Constitution of 1973. Bhutto was overthrown in 1977 by Gen Zia ulHaq. During his tenure from 1977-1988, he can be credited with the rapid Islamization of Pakistan and setting the stage for rise of right wing religious parties in the polity of Pakistan. Ever since then Mullah-Military combine has been trying to dominate the political narrative in the country.

Post Zia, the civilian governments led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif witnessed no effort to undo the process of Islamisation set in motion by Zia. They apparently tried to follow secular style of governance but did not tamper with most of Islamic laws of Bhutto-Zia period.In fact, the religious radical elements were allowed to grow unchallenged by the state and often supported by the bureaucracy leading to large segments of civilian population coming under the influence of the radical ideology. The political parties became dependent on the right-wing religious parties for their vote bank. A number of Islamic laws were introduced during the regime of Nawaz Sharif further strengthening the influence of religion and religious parties. Many of the religious parties patronised the jihadi tanzeems (promoted by ISI) that were active in Afghanistan and Kashmir giving boost to Mullah-Military nexus.

In October 1999, General Parvez Musharraf led a military coup. Musharraf changed the very concept of democracy in Pakistan by legalising the role of army in running the government of the nation. During his regime (1999-2008), the final power did not rest with elected representatives of the people but with military officers and General Musharraf himself. His rise to power gave a hope of checking the rapid growth of radicalisation and Islamisation in Pakistan as he portrayed himself as a secular and moderate leader on the pattern of Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk. After 9/11, under American pressure, he did launch a crack-down on the jihadi outfits. But his policy of “good” and “bad” terrorists back fired. Musharraf true to his character was playing a double-game while actually remaining inclined to Islamists.

Nawaz Sharif came back to power in 2013 with huge mandate, convinced that for once Pakistanis have chosen economics over religion by voting him to power instead of his Islamic rivals.Nawaz Sharif visualised that without changing the nation’s image, he would not be able to attract foreign investments badly needed to boost its sagging economy. He therefore decided to carry political and social reforms including secularisation. In the process he passed a variety of laws aimed at increasing rights for country’s political and religious minorities. He also wanted to improve relations with India for which dismantling terror infrastructure was necessary. This did not go well with Mullah-Military combine. The agitation launched by Islamists after execution of Mumtaz Qadri, assassin of Salman Taseer, a progressive governor of Punjab who was an outspoken critic of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws, forced the government to concede to their right-wing demands. The military also did not support Nawaz’s progressive reforms and idea of secularisation. Under siege from the military and Islamists Nawaz was unable to deliver his electoral promises creating disenchantment among the public. The duo also ensured that his secularisation project fails preventing foreign investment in the country. The people of Pakistan started getting disillusioned with Nawaz Sharif despite his best efforts to address their problems. In a survey carried out in 2016, more than 79% Pakistanis wanted implementation of Sharia laws.The Panama Gate scandal made Nawaz Sharif a lame duck prime minister with the Army calling the shots.

Army is keen in rehabilitating some of these groups by allowing them to join the political mainstream following the strategy of “Accomodation” rather than “Action”before they become too big for their boots and start challenging the authority of Army itself. The Army also has many jihadi sympathisers among its ranks. Nawaz Sharif was opposed to the idea of mainstreaming in view of his bitter experience earlier when he had allowed it in the Punjab in respect of banned Sipah-e-Sahaba. Army successfully organised a “Judicial Coup”, unhappy with Nawaz’s progressive agenda managing his ouster in order to tighten its grip over the federal Government.

Nawaz’s ouster has created a political turmoil in Pakistan. All mainstream political parties are struggling to keep their vote bank intact. The surge of MML and TLP is eating into their vote bank. Army is enjoying a ring side view of the happenings and is hoping to further strengthen its hold over the government through its proxies MML and TLP. Pervaiz Musharraf is also feeling safer with ouster of Nawaz Sharif and is planning a grand alliance of 23 political parties to contest the 2019 national elections. In order to ensure army’s backing he is trying to woo Hafiz Saeed. However, PML-N is opposed to mainstreaming of JuD and has approached Election Commission to not to recognise MML. Taking advantage of the ensuing turmoil and a weak federal government the Army is pushing its agenda of mainstreaming the terrorist organisations. The influence these terrorist organisations have over the Pakistani society has become amply evident after the two bye-elections to National Assembly held recently. Hafiz Saeed is emerging as blue-eyed of the all-powerful army.

Mainstreaming is mainly the process of weaning away terrorist organisations from militant anti-state activities to non-violent political ones. It is presumed that once these organisations join the mainstream they would give up violence and tone down their rhetoric in order to appeal to a greater cross-section of society. The experiment has been successfully implemented in Colombia, Spain and Ireland. However, in all these cases renouncement of all forms of violence and surrender of all weapons were agreed as pre-conditions. But in Pakistan mainstreaming is being visualised as rehabilitation of “good” terrorists which is a dangerous trend. It will not only provide legitimacy to the horrendous crimes committed by them but will also promote violence as an instrument of power. The same was evident in the streets of Rawalpindi recently wherein the agitating Barellvis forced the Prime Minister to dismiss a democratically elected leader from minister ship. The behind-the- scene role played by the army is also worth noting. The danger in mainstreaming the terrorists lies in violence being accepted as a norm which will compel the other political parties to up the ante to remain relevant. Allowing terrorist groups to maintain their militant capacities whilst bestowing political power to them has the potential to backfire. Mainstreaming of terrorist organisations without de-radicalising and negotiations is fraught with danger for already fragile democracy in Pakistan. A one-sided bargain is likely to lead to destabilisation and set the stage for future conflicts. Pakistan army will be well advised to not to look through narrow prism of military dominance and rather keep the long term national interest in mind. The best place for Hafiz Saeed and likes is a jail and barracks for the army.

(The author is a Jammu based political commentator, columnist, security and strategic analyst. He can be reached at anil5457@gmail.com)